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Recent work found distributed resonances in driven oscillator networks and AC power grids. The
emerging dynamic resonance patterns are highly heterogeneous and nontrivial, depending jointly
on the driving frequency, the interaction topology of the network and the node or nodes driven.
Identifying which nodes are most susceptible to dynamic driving and may thus make the system
as a whole vulnerable to external input signals, however, remains a challenge. Here we propose
an easy-to-compute Dynamic Vulnerability Index (DVI) for identifying those nodes that exhibit
largest amplitude responses to dynamic driving signals with given power spectra and thus are most
vulnerable. The DVI is based on linear response theory, as such generic, and enables robust predic-
tions. It thus shows potential for a wide range of applications across dynamically driven networks,
for instance for identifying the vulnerable nodes in power grids driven by fluctuating inputs from
renewable energy sources and fluctuating power output to households.
I. INTRODUCTION
Oscillatory networks, modeling the underlying mech-
anisms of many real-world systems ranging from gene
and neural circuits [1, 2] to AC power grids [3–8], exhibit
highly nontrivial responses to external driving signals [9–
13], due to the complexity in the underlying topology
and the nonlinearity in the coupling function. Recently,
growing attention has been drawn to the topic of dynam-
ically driven networks, in part because of the important
application of the second-order Kuramoto-type oscilla-
tor model in power grid operation and control [12–16].
With an increasing share of fluctuating renewable energy
sources integrated in modern power grids, it is crucial
for grid operators to predict the distributed frequency
responses to systematic and stochastic fluctuations, to
identify which units are most susceptible and may thus
make the system as a whole vulnerable to dynamic in-
puts.
For the example of power grid models, key aspects
of network responses to dynamical perturbations have
been uncovered recently: about the impact of vari-
ous types of perturbation signals, including the scal-
ing in the relaxation of power grids after pulse-like per-
turbations [15, 16], the differential response to static
perturbations[17], the distributed dynamic patterns in
response to dynamic perturbations [12], the fluctuation-
induced non-Gaussian grid frequency distribution [18]
and the escape of a system from an operation state if
driven by white noise [14] and/or non-Gaussian noises
[19, 20]. Specifically, the time-averaged nodal deviations
from the network mean response was ranked using a cen-
trality measure based on the Laplacian spectrum [21].
For lossy networks, averaged nodal sensitivity to fluctua-
tions across network have been numerically investigated
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[22] and estimated via the nodal variance [23]. Yet, it is
still unclear which stochastic signals may cause network-
wide response patterns and how to quickly and precisely
identify those nodes that potentially exhibit most severe
responses and thus are most vulnerable to such pertur-
bations.
The core of the puzzle lies in an intriguing phenomena
of dynamic network resonance[12], which is present in
oscillator models with two (or more) variables per node
(such as the second order Kuramoto model, an oscilla-
tory power grid model) but not in the networks of phase
oscillators such as in the original Kuramoto model [9–12].
While the network responses for low- and high-frequency
signals are trivial thus fairly predictable—homogeneous
responses for slowly-changing signals and localized re-
sponses for fast-changing signals—fluctuations in the res-
onance frequency regime of a network system induce com-
plex resonance patterns in oscillatory networks [12]. The
patterns are jointly determined by the perturbation fre-
quency, the underlying network topology, the initial un-
perturbed network state (base operating state), and the
location of the perturbation and the response of interest.
Although the resonant responses can be deterministically
and precisely computed for given perturbation time se-
ries deriving and evaluating a linear response theory [12],
a straightforward, fast and reliable method for estimat-
ing the resonant response strengths for stochastic signals
is still missing, mainly because such signals contain an
extended band of frequencies.
Here, going beyond structural vulnerability in net-
works, we propose the Dynamic Vulnerability Index
(DVI), a computationally inexpensive vulnerability mea-
sure to assess and to rank the largest possible resonant
response of individual nodes in oscillatory networks. The
networks are driven by stochastic perturbations contain-
ing a characteristic power spectral density (PSD) func-
tion. In power grid research and beyond, the term net-
work vulnerability is typically used to describe the impact
of purely topological changes on network performance
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2[24–28]. The meaning of the vulnerability of a node was
extended to considering the node’s transient response to a
pulse-like perturbation [29, 30], and recently to the time-
averaged response to stochastic perturbations [21]. Here
we propose a Dynamic Vulnerability Index (DVI) that ex-
pands the definition by considering the global maximum
of a node’s dynamic response to a stochastic input signal.
Employing a linear response theory[12] and a frequency-
specific estimate of the resonant response strength, the
DVI exhibits high prediction power and helps to iden-
tify those nodes potentially respond most strongly to a
stochastic resonant perturbation and thereby posing sys-
temic risks in power grid stability. Especially, the DVI
identifies the vulnerable nodes at unexpected locations
in the network not foreseeable from the topology alone.
II. RESONANT NETWORK RESPONSE
PATTERNS
Consider a network of N second-order Kuramoto-type
oscillators with dynamics governed by
θ¨i = Pi − αθ˙i +
N∑
j=1
Kij sin(θj − θi) + δikD(t) (1)
and driven by an external fluctuating signal δikD(t) only
present at node k. Here θi and Pi denote the rota-
tion angle and the natural acceleration of oscillator i
(proportional to power input or output at i), α > 0
parametrizes the damping coefficient and Kij > 0 the
coupling strength of node pair (i, j). The model is equiv-
alent to a coarse-grained model of AC power grids [12]
enabling effective inertia for units with fluctuating power
input from renewables. It describes the collective dynam-
ics of N sub-grids with an effective damping coefficient
α rotating at grid frequency Ω0 = 2pi × 50 Hz (or 60 Hz
in the US and parts of Japan) in the normal operation
state. In this context θi represents the center-of-inertia
angle deviation of sub-grid i to the reference frame rotat-
ing at Ω0, Pi the power generated (P+ > 0) or consumed
(P− < 0) in sub-grid i and Kij the line capacity of the
power transmission between sub-grid i and j. The driv-
ing signal δikD(t) is a fluctuating time series additive to
the average power generation or consumption at sub-grid
k. For the purpose of the modelling setup each sub-grid
is presented as one node of a graph.
How does such a network respond to dynamic input
signals (Fig. 1)? Close to a normal operation state of the
power grid, i.e. a stable fixed point θ∗ := (θ∗1 , · · · , θ∗N ) of
the oscillatory network, the collective response Θ(t) :=
θ(t)− θ∗ to a perturbation vector D(k)(t) defined via its
components D
(k)
i (t) := δikD(t) is accurately given by a
linear response theory [12]
Θ¨(k) = −αΘ˙(k) − LΘ(k) + D(k), (2)
where L with Lij := Kij cos(θ∗j − θ∗i ) for i 6= j and Lii =
−∑j 6=i Lij is a weighted graph Laplacian. The linear
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FIG. 1. Complex network resonance patterns and
large amplitude responses. (a1-a3) Distinct network res-
onance patterns for three driving frequencies. Each node
is color-coded by the relative response strength A
∗(k)
i :=
|Θ˙(k)i |/ limω→0 |Θ˙(k)i | and the driven node is marked with
a black square. In simulation we use per-unit parameters
α = Ω0D¯/2H¯, P+ = Ω0/2H¯, P− = −P+/3, Kij = 2P+ with
the normalized damping coefficient D¯ = 0.02 s2 and the ag-
gregated inertia constant H¯ = 4 s. The network topology is
created by a random growth model of power grid networks
[31].(b) The resonant response patterns varies with driving
frequency in the resonance regime (shaded orange). The rela-
tive response strength of individual nodes are color-coded by
its distance to the driven unit. Grey vertical lines indicate
the N − 1 resonance frequencies ω[`]res.
network response is analytically solvable by projecting
it to the orthogonal eigenspaces of the Laplacian matrix
[12]. For a sinusoidal perturbation D(t) = εei(ωt+ϕ), the
frequency response at unit i to a perturbation at unit k
reads
Θ˙
(k)
i (ω, t) = εe
ı(ωt+ϕ)
N−1∑
`=0
iωv
[`]
k v
[`]
i
−ω2 + ıαω + λ[`] . (3)
Here λ[`] and v
[`]
i denote, respectively, the `-th eigenvalue
and the i-th component of the corresponding eigenvector.
The eigenvalues are indexed as 0 = λ[0] ≤ · · · ≤ λ[N−1].
When one of the eigenmodes is excited, that is, when the
perturbation frequency ω maximizes the contribution of
an eigenmode in Eq. 3 with an eigenfrequency
ω = ω[`]res :=
√
λ[`] − α
2
4
, (4)
the network response is dominated by the resonant eigen-
mode characterized by an overlap factor v
[`]
k v
[`]
i , consti-
tuting a nontrivial, highly heterogeneous dynamic pat-
tern (Fig. 1).
We emphasize that network resonances emerge not
only at a single perturbation frequency, but at all fre-
3quencies in a wide frequency range we call the resonance
regime, i.e.
ω ∈ Ires :=
[√
λ[1] − α
2
4
,
√
λ[N−1] − α
2
4
]
. (5)
Extraordinarily high strengths of frequency response up
to an order-of-magnitude (e.g. 12 times) larger than
the homogeneous response strength in the low frequency
limit [12] may appear across the network (Fig. 1d). Fur-
thermore, the resonant response pattern sharply depends
on the driving frequency. In an exemplary network, the
response pattern appears to be distinctly different for
three frequencies with no more than 1Hz apart from
each other (Fig. 1a-c). Beside the heterogeneity in re-
sponse amplitude, each node’s response additionally ex-
hibits heterogeneous phase delay towards the perturba-
tion signal, due to the characteristic arguments of the
complex responses (3).
III. INDEXING RESONANT RESPONSES
Even perturbed only by a single-frequency resonant
signal, the network already exhibits complex response
patterns in terms of the strength and the phase delay
of the sinusoidal response (3). In reality, power grids
are constantly exposed to noisy fluctuations in renewable
power generation and in the power consumption of house-
holds and industry, which consist of Fourier components
with a wide range of frequencies in the resonance regime,
stochastic magnitudes and random phases. For a given
noisy perturbation time series, the network response time
series is computable by summing up the linear response
to each frequency (3). However, the influence of future
remains unknown. Making general predictions for a net-
work’s complex resonant response to noisy fluctuations,
and particularly, identifying the most susceptible nodes
still remains a challenge.
We propose an index of the vulnerability of individual
nodes in a network under resonant perturbations, the
Dynamic Vulnerability Index (DVI), which helps to rank
the maximum resonant response magnitude for perturba-
tions with a characteristic PSD S(ω). Measurements of
wind and solar power systems indicate that both of the
strongly fluctuating renewable power sources are charac-
terized by a power-law PSD with the Kolmogorov expo-
nent −5/3, see Ref. 32. Such a characteristic PSD allows
for estimating Fourier components’ amplitudes through
the relation ε(ω) ∝ S(ω) 12 . We thus define the DVI for
node i given a noisy perturbation with PSD S(ω) driving
node k as
DVI
(k)
i =
∑
ω∈Ires
S(ω)
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
N−1∑
`=0
ıωv
[`]
k v
[`]
i
−ω2 + ıαω + λ[`]
∣∣∣∣∣ . (6)
Here we assume that the response to a noisy fluctuation,
as the real part of the sum of the complex responses
Θ˙
(k)
i (ω) (3) to each Fourier component of frequency ω,
approaches the sum of the magnitudes of Θ˙
(k)
i (ω) for suf-
ficiently long time series with length T .
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FIG. 2. The ranking of DVI well predicts the rank-
ing of maximum resonant responses. A time series of a
resonant driving signal (a) is extracted from a colored noise
with a PSD exponent −5/3 (b). According to the PSD of
the original noise (black dots), the resonant signal is obtained
by filtering the frequencies in the original signal and keeping
only the ones (orange dots) in the resonance regime (shaded
in orange). The ranking of the maximum frequency response
max
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣Θ˙(k)i (t)∣∣∣ in the simulation T = 100s is shown by a heat
map in (c) and the ranking of the DVI (6) with S(ω) ∝ ω−5/3
also by a heat map in (d). The perturbed node is marked
with a black square. Three exemplary unexpected vulnerable
nodes (marked with circles) are successfully predicted by the
DVI. The network settings is the same as in Fig. 1.
Note that the PSD S(ω) gives only the scaling infor-
mation of ε(ω), so the relative value of DVI among all
nodes within a network is more relevant rather than its
absolute value. The ranking of DVI thus provides infor-
mation about which nodes are most susceptible rather
than predicting the actual response magnitudes. For in-
stance, in a 100-second simulation (Fig. 2), the ranking
of the numerically determined maximum frequency re-
sponse appears to be highly similar to the ranking given
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FIG. 3. Fast-converging, robustly high prediction per-
formance of DVI ranking. (a) The prediction error drops
sharply at first, decreases over time and rests at a level about
85% lower than the error of random guesses. The Gaussian er-
ror distribution of random guesses [33] is indicated by various
shades of grey: black line for the expectation value of E for
random guesses, areas colored with different shades of grey for
intervals 1±ρ, 1±2ρ, 1±3ρ respectively with ρ being the ratio
between the standard deviation and the expectation value of
E for random guesses. (b) A snapshot of the prediction er-
ror’s dependence on signal’s PSD exponent at T = 100s. The
prediction error increases slightly for larger PSD exponents
of the driving signal. In both panels the prediction error is
color-coded by the PSD exponent of the driving signal. (c-
e) At T = 100s, the DVI exhibits a high correlation with
the maximal frequency response for various PSD exponents
b ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
by DVI. Particularly, it gives warnings about some par-
ticular nodes (marked in circles) which are far away from
the perturbation, unexpected based solely on topology
(e.g. not dead-ends [34]), but especially vulnerable due
to resonances.
We further quantitatively investigate the prediction
performance of DVI in terms of its robustness over time
and over the stochastic features of fluctuations. We mea-
sure DVI’s prediction error with a normalized Spear-
man’s footrule distance [33] between the predicted rank-
ing of the maximal σˆDVI(i) and the actual ranking σ(i)
E :=
1
Erand
N∑
i=1
|σˆDVI(i)− σ(i)| . (7)
The prediction error is normalized by the expectation
value of the Spearman’s footrule distance Erand = N
2/3
between two random rankings chosen independently and
uniformly in the set SN of permutation of N elements,
see Ref. 33. Numerical results show that the ranking
σ of the maximum response from direct simulation con-
verges fast to the a priori DVI ranking σˆDVI (Fig. 3a).
For a 100 second perturbation time series, we measure
the true ranking σ every 0.1 second and compute the
footrule distance E. For a sample power grid with the
eigenfrequencies ∼ 1 Hz (Ires = [0.32 Hz, 3.74 Hz]), the
prediction error drops about 80% in the first 10 seconds
and continues to decrease slowly. At T = 100s, the pre-
diction error drops to about 15% of random guess error
level and the DVI is highly correlated to the maximal fre-
quency responses with Pearson’s correlation coefficient r
larger than 0.985 (Fig. 3c-e). Furthermore, we find the
prediction performance of DVI is quite robust over time
and for different types of colored noise with the power-
law exponent b ∈ [0, 2], from white noise to brown noise.
The prediction error remains at almost the same level
and shows only a mild increase with growing b (Fig. 3b).
IV. CONCLUSION
We presented a measure of dynamic node vulnerabil-
ity to predict the most resonant nodes in stochastically
driven oscillator networks and specifically AC power grid
models. Based on a linear response theory of the net-
work’s resonance patterns for a single frequency, we pro-
pose to estimate the susceptibility of a node to stochas-
tic driving signals by i) estimating the driving signal’s
Fourier spectrum by its PSD characteristics and ii) accu-
mulating the response amplitudes to each Fourier compo-
nents. Numerical results indicate strong prediction power
of the proposed DVI in identifying the most resonant
nodes. The true ranking of maximum response from di-
rect simulation converges fast to the ranking prediction
given by DVI, thus revealing the most vulnerable nodes.
The prediction performance is robust not only over time,
but also for various types of colored noise sources. For
all tested settings, ranging from white noise to brown
noise b ∈ [0, 2], the prediction error stays at a low level
and the DVI ranking highly correlates with the true re-
sponse ranking, with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient
larger than 0.985.
Given the position and the characteristic PSD of the
driving signal, for instance the location of a wind farm in
a power grid network, the ranking of the DVI obtained
from (6) may help to identify which stations in the power
grid would particularly be influenced by the resonant sig-
nals carried by the fluctuating wind power input, allowing
precautionary measures to be taken. As the method is
robust and computationally fast, it might also be appli-
cable ad hoc if the network changes after failures or other
unforeseen events such as load shedding.
Furthermore, the DVI may support optimizing future
power grid planning. For instance, new stations or new
lines should be built in a way that important units in
the network would not suffer from severe resonant dis-
turbances in the altered network topology.
5Taken together, the proposed dynamic vulnerability
index provides a powerful tool to rank the nodal reso-
nance level in networks of dynamical units. Whereas the
presentation above is focused on the second order Ku-
ramoto model to overcome previous analytic limitations,
the index is readily generalized, both to phase oscillator
networks (with single variable nodes) and more complex
systems such as networks of the third order model of
power grids and more generally, networks of oscillatory
and non-oscillatory dynamic units.
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